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1Introduction
assure, as REAL’s experience illustrates, wide varia-
tions in quality—and substantial investment will not 
long ﬂow to programs that cannot offer consistent 
quality as they expand.
How Does a Program Work and Why 
Does It Work?
What structures, activities and external relation-
ships are crucial to a program’s success? While the 
particular essential elements vary from program 
to program, they generally include demographic or 
other characteristics of participants; intensity and 
duration of programming; the content and ﬂexibility 
of activities; key transition points for participants; 
the presence and types of requirements and incen-
tives for participation; performance expectations 
for participants and staff; staff qualiﬁcations and 
conﬁguration; characteristics of the organization 
that operates the program; and the program’s rela-
tionships with other organizations and agencies. 
Identifying these elements for a program that 
seems ready to expand is a fundamentally impor-
tant task. Replication and expansion efforts require 
substantial commitments from funders, developers 
of the program being replicated and practitioners 
who adopt it in their communities. All beneﬁt when 
they have an accurate understanding of what leads 
to the program’s positive outcomes. Knowing which 
elements need to be implemented helps funders 
calculate the costs of the program and decide 
whether it is a worthwhile investment. For devel-
opers, or whoever is leading the replication effort, 
identifying the essential elements is the necessary 
ﬁrst step in creating materials and training plans 
and providing new sites with effective guidance for 
implementation. This level of speciﬁcity also allows 
practitioners who might be interested in adopting 
the program to make informed decisions about 
When REAL Enterprises (Rural Entrepreneurship 
through Action Learning) began operations in 1990, 
it was among the earliest nonproﬁt initiatives to 
catch the wave of new social entrepreneurship that 
has since become an important focus of contempo-
rary philanthropy. Launched by a dynamic visionary, 
REAL taught entrepreneurial skills to rural high-
school and post-secondary students. In true entre-
preneurial spirit, the idea caught on quickly, and in a 
matter of a few years, REAL programs had popped 
up in several states.
But there was a problem. Other than the name, 
a belief in the value of entrepreneurship train-
ing and an annual gathering, the programs did not 
have much in common. Because REAL’s founders 
favored allowing each program to follow its own 
path, there were no well-deﬁned standards govern-
ing the replication of their approach around the 
country.  As a result, program activities and quality 
varied markedly, making it increasingly difﬁcult for 
REAL to generate support and funding nationally. 
Recognizing that they were not likely to succeed 
by continuing to let a thousand ﬂowers bloom, 
REAL’s leaders decided, six years after its launch, 
to deﬁne the program in a speciﬁc way for the ﬁrst 
time and establish program standards to guide the 
replication process in the future.1
REAL Enterprises’ story is not unusual. Programs 
that seem like strong candidates for application 
in new settings often fail to deﬁne their essential 
elements clearly, completely or, occasionally, at all. 
Sometimes program developers are so immersed 
in the operating details of their programs that it is 
difﬁcult for them to step back and accurately iden-
tify the key components. Other times, developers 
intentionally deﬁne their models in general terms in 
order to broaden their appeal or in anticipation of 
a need to accommodate local differences. Failure to 
deﬁne the program precisely does not necessarily 
prevent initial replication, but it does almost  
2whether it is a good ﬁt with their agency’s priori-
ties and with local characteristics, and what would 
be required of them if they became a site.
Identifying essential elements is typically not an 
easy task. Programs are forms of knowledge, and 
one can never be entirely certain how the knowl-
edge reﬂected in any given change model causes 
the favorable results attributed to it.2 Some ambigu-
ity always remains. Social programs have the added 
complexity of focusing on trying to modify the 
behavior or attitudes of people—either program 
participants or those who affect them. And since 
programs are, in essence, co-produced by their 
staffs, participants and others, they will inevitably 
vary to some extent from one location to the next 
because the people involved vary. These are not 
arguments against identifying essential elements. 
Rather, they are reasons for being particularly care-
ful, when analyzing program experiences, to deﬁne 
those essential elements and to identify what ﬂex-
ibility programs must have so they can be adapted 
to local circumstances without compromising the 
ability to achieve results.
The Structure of This Report
The following paper draws on the experiences of 
the Replication and Expansion unit of Public/Private 
Ventures. It takes its examples from three programs 
that were designed in different ways, have been in 
existence for varying amounts of time and had differ-
ent degrees of opportunity to reﬁne their operations 
before preparing to expand to new sites. The ﬁrst, 
Philadelphia@Work, is a transitional work program 
that was developed to help the hard-to-employ gain 
work experience and get unsubsidized jobs to meet 
the requirements of the 1996 federal welfare reform 
law. Given the urgency of the problem, the program 
was designed and implemented quickly, and to some 
extent it was still in the process of self-modiﬁcation 
(in its original location in Philadelphia) when it began 
to prepare for replication in response to other cities’ 
interest in effective transitional work models.
Plain Talk, the second program proﬁled here, is a teen 
pregnancy prevention initiative that focuses on sexu-
ally active youth. An evaluation of the initiative in 
several demonstration sites found promising results,3 
and the program’s developers at the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation wanted to extend the initiative to other 
communities. However, Plain Talk did not yet have a 
single, well-deﬁned program model to replicate. The 
initiative had been piloted in ﬁve sites, and recognizing 
the challenges involved in forging a wide consensus 
on a topic as sensitive as adolescent sexuality, the 
developers had taken a decidedly grassroots approach. 
While they had presented sites with Plain Talk’s basic 
objectives and possible strategies for implementation, 
each of the ﬁve sites had, to a large extent, crafted the 
speciﬁc elements of its program so it would be most 
likely to work in the given community. Now, in order 
to expand Plain Talk, developers had to identify which 
elements had contributed to the positive evaluation 
ﬁndings and build on those elements to construct a 
replicable program model with enough ﬂexibility to 
adjust to relevant local differences.
The third program is the Nurse-Family Partnership 
(NFP), in which nurses visit low-income women 
in their homes during pregnancy and the ﬁrst two 
years of the child’s life. The program was developed 
in the 1970s in response to the emerging realiza-
tion that the early childhood years were crucial in 
shaping the life course of both children and their 
parents, and that without help during this period, 
low-income families were at greater risk for poor 
outcomes. By the time the NFP was ready to ex-
pand in the late 1990s, it had been tested and re-
ﬁned in three communities over a period of almost 
20 years; random assignment research, the most 
demanding form of evaluation, had established the 
model’s effectiveness.4 Because of this long and 
3rigorous history, it was initially relatively easy to 
deﬁne the program’s essential elements. But as the 
replication proceeded, experience pointed to the 
need to adjust and modify the model if its effec-
tiveness was going to be realized and sustained in 
new locations.
While each program represents a different  
approach to identifying essential elements, they  
all point toward the critical role played by this 
task. A concluding section of this paper brieﬂy 
draws together the experiences with these pro-
grams to outline several lessons that should be 
useful for other programs or initiatives seeking  
to extend their reach.
The federal welfare reform law enacted in 1996 
imposed stiff new work requirements and time 
limits on public assistance. Philadelphia@Work 
was established to help welfare recipients with the 
greatest barriers to employment meet these new 
requirements, and from the time the program was 
conceived, the hope of many of those involved was 
that if it proved successful it could be offered for 
replication in other communities. The new law’s 
emphasis on getting recipients off the rolls and into 
unsubsidized jobs sooner rather than later created 
demand around the country for already-available 
models. If Philadelphia@Work helped enough re-
cipients get and keep jobs in a tough urban environ-
ment like Philadelphia, the thinking was that it could 
probably accomplish similar results for the hard-to-
employ in other locations as well. Getting the pro-
gram off to a quick, effective start would allow the 
prospects for its replication to be considered while 
states and communities still had substantial unspent 
funds under the federal law.
An Evolving Design
The initial model for Philadelphia@Work was 
based on experience with supported work pro-
grams,5 and in many respects it had a logical and 
coherent design from the start. Its elements were 
intended to build cohesively toward the goal of 
moving participants into unsubsidized jobs with 
wages and beneﬁts, leading to ﬁnancial stability. 
The program provided intensive orientation and 
then placed participants in transitional work that 
suited their skills and interests and would make for 
valuable learning experiences. While in their transi-
tional jobs, participants also spent up to ten hours 
a week in workshops designed to strengthen their 
skills. The program developed leads for suitable 
unsubsidized jobs, and after participants entered 
those jobs, staff stayed in touch with them for sev-
eral months to help address potential problems. 
 A Single-Site Model: 
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4All along the way the program provided help, when 
necessary, with supports such as transportation 
and child care.
While these elements existed in the original design, 
the experience of implementation in Philadelphia 
had led to several important adaptations. First, im-
plementers had worked to shape the program’s cul-
ture so it more precisely reinforced program goals. 
They treated participants as employees rather than 
clients, and tried to ensure that their experiences 
in the program were consistent with the rules and 
norms of the private labor market in which they 
were ultimately expected to ﬁnd and keep jobs. 
This businesslike approach seemed likely to ease 
participants’ movement into the culture of the 
work world. In addition, many of the participants 
had been unsuccessful in previous job-preparation 
programs, and it was motivating for them to be in 
a culture that felt different from places where they 
considered themselves to have failed.
Another important modiﬁcation took place when it 
became clear that the original stafﬁng structure was 
beginning to work against the program’s effective-
ness. Over time, as the program grew and the num-
ber of staff increased, departments in the Transi-
tional Work Corporation (TWC), the organization 
running the program, began to build silos around 
themselves. The various staff members who worked 
with participants during transitional job placements, 
professional development training, and placement 
and retention in unsubsidized jobs did not regularly 
communicate with one another. As a result, despite 
the coherence that theoretically underlay program 
activities, participants were being lost in the gaps 
between departments. Once the problem was 
identiﬁed, staff were reorganized into teams that 
included a career advisor, a professional develop-
ment workshop facilitator, a job developer and a 
retention specialist. Each team became responsible 
for about 100 participants throughout their time 
in the program—a structural change that improved 
communication among staff and coordination of 
services for participants.
TWC was still settling into this staff reorganization 
when outsiders’ interest in tapping the program’s 
rapidly evolving expertise began to intensify. With 
support from private funders, TWC entered into an 
agreement to help the employment and family ser-
vices authority in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where 
Cleveland is located, develop a program based on 
Philadelphia@Work. The National League of Cities, 
in Washington, D.C., established a project to help 
cities wanting to create new or better transitional 
jobs programs for welfare recipients, and recruited 
TWC to be a key provider of technical assistance. 
The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 
the largest funder of Philadelphia@Work, solic-
ited TWC’s help in developing a similar effort for 
people with limited English language skills. TWC 
was also called on by the U.S. Department of Labor 
to help other local employment programs design 
information systems to track their participants’ 
characteristics and progress.
It is not unusual for a program to emerge at the right 
time, do a good job, and then, before it has worked 
all the kinks out of its own design, be called upon to 
help others. The issue TWC faced was whether to 
continue to wait for others to ask for its assistance 
or to pursue a more proactive replication strategy. 
On the one hand, responding to emergent demands 
required relatively modest investments of time and 
effort and minimized the risk to TWC if its help to 
others failed to pay off. On the other, such modest 
investments would probably mean smaller results 
than could be achieved through actual replication. The 
challenge of replication, however, was that the pro-
gram in Philadelphia was not a ﬁnished product: it had 
generated good outcomes so far, but that was only 
over a three-year period and only in one site. Could 
Philadelphia@Work, a young work-in-progress, re-
produce its effectiveness in other communities?
5Deﬁning the Replicable Model
Answering this question involved examining 
both the program model and the environments 
in which it might be replicated. TWC had been 
highly intentional about the ongoing design of 
Philadelphia@Work. Detailed manuals and guidance 
documents existed from which one could derive 
a speciﬁc understanding of how the program was 
supposed to operate. However, like many programs 
rooted in a single site, it was not necessarily the 
case that every element of the program in Philadel-
phia could or should be required in new sites. Thus, 
the only way to get at the required elements was 
to break the program down into the detailed fea-
tures of its Philadelphia operation and judge wheth-
er each feature would be essential to performance 
if the program were adopted in other cities.
The deﬁnition of the essential elements of 
Philadelphia@Work occurred in two stages. Be-
cause the program had not been formally evaluated, 
the initial stage involved a more general review to 
determine whether it was worthwhile to attempt 
to replicate it. Worthiness was assessed by asking 
a ﬁve-part question relevant to just about any pro-
gram being considered for replication:
 Does the program (1) address an important 
public problem using (2) legitimate methods that 
can achieve (3) positive, measurable results in a (4) 
timely manner, and (5) can alternative explanations 
for those results be ruled out or minimized?
The major concern involved the level of conﬁdence 
one could have that the program, and not other 
factors, was the main cause of its positive results 
in placing participants in unsubsidized jobs. The 
program’s brief track record in a generally favor-
able labor market for low-income workers raised 
the possibility that the model might not be as ef-
fective if the market had a downturn. But given the 
almost relentless failure of previous efforts to help 
the hardest to employ, Philadelphia@Work’s short-
term results made it appear worthwhile to move 
ahead with replication.
This initial stage of examining the program also 
involved deﬁning the model as it existed in Phila-
delphia to understand whether the elements were 
speciﬁc enough and ﬁt together well enough to 
make it possible for other communities to replicate 
it. This examination did not yet ask which elements 
were essential and which were not, but whether, 
overall, the program was well designed and rela-
tively straightforward. Philadelphia@Work easily 
passed this test.
With the Philadelphia operating model clearly and 
speciﬁcally deﬁned in this ﬁrst stage, the second 
stage focused on making logical judgments about 
the necessity of each element in reproducing the 
program’s outcomes in other sites. Elements were 
examined with the intent of not only identifying 
requirements for replication but also developing an 
understanding of the nature and scope of any ﬂex-
ibility that should be built into each requirement if 
the program was to be successful elsewhere.
Several elements seemed important for inclusion in 
the replicable model: they were believed to be criti-
cal to the performance of the program in Philadel-
phia, and could be implemented in a fairly straight-
forward way in new settings. They included:
• Focusing on those adults for whom an intensive 
short-term program would be most cost-effective—
adults with little or no previous work experience 
and with other barriers to employment, such as 
prolonged welfare dependency and poor education. 
A new site would not have to serve everyone 
who might qualify under this deﬁnition. It could 
focus on one or more subgroups (for example, 
ex-offenders or the homeless), depending on 
community needs and resources.
6• Requiring all participants to go through an intensive 
two-week orientation to prepare them for entry into 
transitional employment. While the precise con-
tent and format of the orientation could vary in 
new sites, the overall focus would be on teach-
ing participants about workplace etiquette and 
responsibility, matching them with appropriate 
transitional placements and making arrange-
ments for any support services that might be 
necessary, such as child care, transportation or 
substance abuse counseling.
• Placing participants in transitional jobs for at least 
25 hours a week, up to six months, at the prevail-
ing local minimum wage. Participants would be 
placed in jobs consistent with their aptitude and 
interests, thus preparing them for unsubsidized 
employment. Within these parameters, arrange-
ments could vary: for example, a new site might 
require more hours of work per week or pay at 
a level above the minimum wage.
• Providing participants with training during their 
transitional placements in order to strengthen the 
skills they would need for unsubsidized employ-
ment. The format and content of training could 
vary to meet the needs of different participants.
• Treating participants as employees of the organiza-
tion that operated the program. This approach 
helped reinforce work values, reduced the 
burden on transitional employers and assured 
competent supervision of each participant. Vari-
ations would be possible around the speciﬁc 
form supervision took, so long as it was carried 
out by skilled people on a consistent basis.
• Tracking participants’ progress using a manage-
ment information system designed speciﬁcally for a 
transitional employment program. The categories 
of data would need to be the same across sites, 
but how the data were collected could vary.
While these elements were highly consistent with 
the Philadelphia program model, there were four ad-
ditional elements that had deﬁned the approach in 
Philadelphia but would probably need to be modiﬁed 
to suit circumstances in other communities—with-
out, it was hoped, putting performance at risk. First, 
Philadelphia@Work had been created through an 
unusual partnership of state and city government and 
a large private foundation. Given the complex work 
requirements and funding streams that had resulted 
from the new welfare reform law, this partnership 
brought real beneﬁts. State and city support was ob-
viously essential for the program to succeed, and the 
foundation’s support had made it possible to establish 
a new, independent nonproﬁt organization, TWC, to 
operate the program and devote signiﬁcant attention 
to developing ties with private-sector employers. 
New sites, however, were unlikely to be able to 
replicate this unusual level of collaboration and 
support, consolidated in an organization set up 
speciﬁcally to run the program. Thus, in deﬁning 
the replicable model, it was necessary to give new 
sites the ﬂexibility to design a different organiza-
tional arrangement, so long as it reﬂected what 
was considered essential about the structure in 
Philadelphia. Ultimately, that element focused on 
the characteristics of the organization that would 
run the program: it should be a well-managed non-
proﬁt with direct support from both the public 
and private sectors and the ability to focus a large 
share of its organizational effort on the transi-
tional work initiative.
Second, while Philadelphia@Work had used only 
nonproﬁt and public agencies for its transitional 
work placements, it seemed sensible to allow rep-
lication sites to use for-proﬁt employers as well, so 
long as the resulting placements did not displace 
regular jobs. Philadelphia has a committed public 
sector and a large and diverse nonproﬁt sector, 
including one of the largest concentrations of       
7hospitals in the world. It could not be assumed that 
other communities would have the same degree of 
access to nonproﬁt and public employers.
A third element that required modiﬁcation con-
cerned the length of time that new sites should fol-
low up with participants after they entered unsub-
sidized employment. This aspect of the program had 
been debated in Philadelphia from the outset. Ini-
tially, the model called for a year of follow-up. The 
time requirement in Philadelphia was then revised 
to six months, both to keep program costs under 
control and to reﬂect the reality that participants 
had different degrees of need after they started 
work in unsubsidized jobs. Thus, while it was clearly 
essential that replication sites have a follow-up 
component, they could be ﬂexible in deciding how 
long they would stay in contact with participants.
A ﬁnal modiﬁcation involved the program’s stafﬁng 
roles. As a large program, Philadelphia@Work had 
developed complex stafﬁng consisting of several job 
categories—this complexity could feel daunting to 
potential replicators and might not be necessary 
in smaller-scale versions of the program. Thus, the 
replication model included one key stafﬁng role: a 
career advisor who worked with each participant 
throughout their time in the program. During rep-
lication, sites could be helped to build a stafﬁng 
structure based on this central position and with 
an emphasis on teamwork in assisting participants. 
Focusing on this key role and giving it the busi-
ness-oriented title “career advisor” would have 
the additional advantage of making the program’s 
culture and goals easier to discuss with prospective 
funders, policymakers and members of the public.
The practical purpose of deﬁning the replicable 
version of Philadelphia@Work was to provide 
interested communities with the information they 
would need to make an initial assessment of the 
appropriateness of adopting the program. This in-
formation included not just the description of the 
model but also estimates of the cost of replicating it 
based on Philadelphia’s experience. If program devel-
opers provide too little, or too general, information, it 
becomes difﬁcult for potential replicators to make a 
rational decision about whether the program is right 
for them. The ambiguity creates room to misinterpret 
requirements and expectations. TWC wanted inter-
ested communities to be as clear as possible about 
what would be involved if they chose to replicate.
The program description, including cost estimates, 
was used to market test the interest of several 
communities in adopting Philadelphia@Work. On 
the whole, community leaders liked the model and 
could see how its features might offer an effective 
way to help the hard-to-employ. However, by the 
time of the market study, resources for replication 
had dwindled. When TWC ﬁrst began considering 
replication, funding was still available around the 
country for welfare-to-work programs, but dollars 
dried up quickly as the time constraints of welfare 
reform pressed states and localities to act. In an 
overall environment of shrinking resources, inter-
est seemed to be shifting toward less expensive 
models capable of serving all welfare recipients, 
regardless of their relative employability. TWC 
was able to continue to provide technical assis-
tance on transitional work programs, but a full 
replication would have to wait until the funding 
environment improved.
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only one site, the process of identifying essential 
elements was relatively straightforward. The situ-
ation with Plain Talk, which had been piloted in 
ﬁve communities around the country, was more 
complex. The impetus for that initiative had come 
from a comparison of adolescent sexual activity, 
pregnancy and birth rates, and sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs) in the United States and Europe. 
The program’s developers at the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation noted that while rates of sexual activ-
ity for adolescent women were similar, pregnancy 
and birth rates and the incidence of STDs were 
signiﬁcantly higher in the U.S. A major reason for 
the lower rates in Europe appeared to be that 
youth there had greater access to contraceptive 
services and received stronger, more consistent 
messages in support of contraceptive use than 
did youth in the U.S. In addition, research in this 
country suggested that youth’s peers, rather than 
adults, were their primary source of sexual and 
contraceptive information; that given the right en-
vironment, adults would be able to communicate 
effectively with youth about sexual responsibility; 
and that the community can play an important role 
in the sexual decision-making of its youth.6
Building on this research, Plain Talk was intended 
to create a consensus among a community’s adults 
about the need to protect sexually active youth by 
encouraging early and consistent use of contracep-
tives, and to provide the adults with information 
and skills that would help them communicate effec-
tively with adolescents about sexual responsibility. 
Program developers helped the demonstration sites 
identify potential approaches for engaging residents 
in the initiative, and each community then tailored 
its strategies to meet local conditions.
An independent evaluation of the initiative showed 
promising results: the Plain Talk communities had 
succeeded in increasing levels of adult-youth com-
munication about sexual responsibility, and youth 
who talked with adults used birth control more often 
and were less likely to have an STD or pregnancy.7 
Given these ﬁndings, program developers were inter-
ested in extending Plain Talk to new sites. While the 
teen pregnancy rate had been declining for some time, 
the incidence of pregnancy and STDs among youth in 
poor communities continued to be much higher than 
elsewhere. In addition, efforts such as the National 
Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy had helped to 
increase the attention being given to teen sexuality. 
Plain Talk’s developers believed that the climate was 
right for using the positive experiences of the pilot 
sites to develop similar projects in other poor com-
munities. But ﬁrst they needed to know which activi-
ties had contributed to the positive ﬁndings.
Five Sites—Five Program Designs
The ﬁve sites in the demonstration had been given 
wide latitude by the Foundation in shaping their 
programs, and they used that latitude to develop 
different approaches. All of them had conducted a 
community mapping or survey—the one required 
activity—to gather systematic information about 
the conditions that Plain Talk was targeting for 
change. These included community adults’ attitudes 
and knowledge about adolescent sexuality and 
contraceptive use, as well as community youth’s at-
titudes, knowledge and behavior concerning sexual 
responsibility. This community data collection effort 
was intended to provide each site with key infor-
mation it would need in designing its program.
Although each site carried out the mapping activity, 
its actual execution differed in important ways that 
reﬂected the nature of each community. In New 
Orleans, the site was a large public housing project 
whose resident council took the lead in getting 
the survey completed. The Atlanta site, serving a 
somewhat larger geographic area, invited local resi-
dents to a barbecue to tell them about Plain Talk 
A Multisite Community 
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with a strong interest were recruited to conduct 
the survey. The San Diego site, based in a Latino 
neighborhood, relied on an active informal network 
among residents and local organizational leaders to 
identify people trusted in the neighborhood to do 
the survey.
The lead agency in each site used the ﬁndings from 
the community mapping as a guide for develop-
ing that community’s Plain Talk activities, although, 
again, the actual approach differed from site to site. 
Some sites shared the ﬁndings with residents and 
engaged them in helping to decide which activities 
would be most appropriate; other sites worked 
mainly through professionally run agencies serving 
the community to determine how to apply the re-
sults of the survey.
The decision whether to involve residents or rely 
primarily on professionals in these early stages of 
the initiative appeared, in turn, to inﬂuence the 
kinds of activities each site implemented. Sites with 
stronger resident involvement in the community-
mapping phase tended toward activities that could 
be led by neighborhood members themselves. 
Atlanta developed the concept of “askable adults,” 
residents with whom youth could feel comfortable 
talking about responsible sexual behavior. New 
Orleans and San Diego created a paid role for resi-
dents as lay health educators, called Walkers & Talk-
ers in New Orleans and Promotoras in San Diego, 
who conducted outreach and education workshops 
for other community adults, providing information 
about sexual responsibility and skills needed to 
communicate effectively with adolescents on this 
topic. These three sites also used home health par-
ties to inform community residents about ﬁndings 
from the survey, to promote the importance of 
adult-teen communication about sex and to help 
adults learn to communicate with youth on this 
issue in a nonjudgmental way.
All three of these sites initially used professionals 
to train small groups of residents to become Plain 
Talk leaders, but they intended to have the profes-
sionals move into the background as the residents 
gained the skills and conﬁdence to educate other 
adults about the importance of communicating 
with youth. While those sites approached Plain Talk 
by developing resident leadership for the initiative, 
the other two relied on community institutions to 
provide workshops to local adults about sexual-
ity and communication. One of those sites sought 
to integrate Plain Talk into the existing activities 
of community agencies, while the other worked 
through the local school system to have workshops 
for parents conducted in the schools.
Identifying What Worked
Because the initiative had taken different forms in 
the ﬁve pilot sites, it was necessary to prepare for 
replication by going back to those communities 
and having them reconstruct, activity by activity, 
the speciﬁc Plain Talk program they had designed. 
Each site’s activities could then be examined in 
relation to the site’s performance data, including 
the number of community adults it had reached 
and prepared to communicate with youth. This 
process required interviewing lead agency staff and 
community residents involved in the initiative and, 
where possible, reviewing written materials. It was 
important to be able to understand not just the 
general outlines of what the sites had done but 
the speciﬁcs of how they had done it so a detailed 
guide could be developed to help new sites plan 
and implement a successful Plain Talk program in 
their own communities.
But there were challenges in getting speciﬁc informa-
tion. The demonstration project had ended three 
years before this effort at reconstruction took place, 
and some of the lead agencies no longer had much, 
or any, written documentation about the initiative’s   
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planning and implementation. In some cases, staff and 
residents involved with Plain Talk had left the com-
munity: at one site, the initiative had taken place in a 
housing project that had since been torn down, and 
all of the residents involved in Plain Talk had moved 
elsewhere. Even when staff and residents were still 
present, it was not always easy for them to remember 
in detail the history of Plain Talk in their community. 
To help compensate for the passage of time and 
absence of documentation, two sets of interviews 
were carried out with informants from each site. 
A ﬁrst set was used to identify the activities that 
each had conducted. The resulting descriptions 
were then examined for logical gaps (for example, 
how the speciﬁc information from the community 
mapping was used to help shape program efforts) 
and activities that needed further clariﬁcation. The 
questions emerging from this examination became 
the framework for the second set of interviews. 
Similar to Plain Talk’s community mapping of knowl-
edge and attitudes, the objective here was to create 
a map of each site’s program, including both the 
speciﬁc activities and their interrelationships.
Based on these reconstructions, it was possible, 
looking across the experiences of the ﬁve sites, to 
identify three activities that seemed to have most 
contributed to the positive evaluation ﬁndings and 
that lent themselves to replication. One was the 
community mapping. Although each site had imple-
mented this activity somewhat differently, in all 
cases the data collected through the mapping had 
made it possible for the site to start from the views 
of the community as it planned its Plain Talk pro-
gram—an important ﬁrst step for any community 
change initiative, because the resulting efforts are 
more likely to be perceived as legitimate by resi-
dents, increasing the probability of impact.
The other two activities were the Walkers & Talk-
ers/Promotoras and the home health parties, which 
together had been effective in reaching large num-
bers of community residents and preparing them to 
be “askable adults”—people who could communi-
cate effectively with youth about sexual responsibil-
ity and contraception. For several reasons, work-
shops conducted by professionals had been less 
successful. Community adults were more comfort-
able talking with, and learning from, their peers than 
they were with professionals. And sites that trained 
adults through workshops had struggled in their 
efforts to recruit a new set of participants for each 
new series of workshops. In contrast, the home 
health parties had been self-sustaining and, thus, 
reached many more people: someone would attend 
a home health party and then offer to host a similar 
party herself. It was also clear that the initiative 
needed to have its own standing in the community 
and needed to be identiﬁed with its own activities. 
Integrating it too much into existing activities con-
fused the issue of who really owned the effort and 
ran the risk of diluting the Plain Talk message.
In addition, the community mapping, Walkers & 
Talkers/Promotoras and home health parties 
all cohered—they reinforced one another as key 
components. The community mapping provided es-
sential information that could motivate adults to 
become involved in Plain Talk by learning to com-
municate with youth. The Walkers & Talkers/Pro-
motoras recruited hosts and participants for, and 
helped to lead, the home health parties, where they 
would present the survey ﬁndings to adult residents 
and provide training and information that made 
them “askable adults.” Because it was essential that 
the Walkers & Talkers/Promotoras were community 
residents—and many of them did not have cars—it 
was important that they have easy access to the 
agency operating Plain Talk. Thus, it was also consid-
ered essential that the agency be physically located 
within the community. Those four elements became 
the heart of the Plain Talk model.
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With those components identiﬁed, the developers 
of Plain Talk were able to prepare a detailed guide 
for implementing the program’s essential elements 
in other communities, as well as a curriculum for 
training new Walkers & Talkers/Promotoras.8 They 
also contracted with a technical assistance pro-
vider to support the replication sites, and are de-
veloping an approach for collecting common data 
on how programs operate and the results they 
achieve. In addition, the individual components of 
the program can be, and in some cases are be-
ing, implemented as parts of other undertakings. 
The Walkers & Talkers/Promotoras component, 
for example, is being integrated into another teen 
pregnancy prevention model that is currently be-
ing replicated by a different organization. And 
community mapping can work as the ﬁrst step in a 
wide variety of community-based initiatives. While 
not all programs offered for replication can useful-
ly have their components individualized in this way, 
the Plain Talk replication model was intentionally 
designed to make it possible.
Unlike Philadelphia@Work and Plain Talk, the 
Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP), which was de-
signed to improve the health and life prospects of 
low-income mothers and their children, was a ma-
ture program with a well-established model when it 
prepared to begin its replication initiative. Because 
the program had been tested, reﬁned and writ-
ten about for almost 20 years, the initial process 
for identifying essential elements was a relatively 
straightforward effort codifying knowledge that 
already existed.
However, identifying essential elements and un-
derstanding how they may have to be modiﬁed in 
expansion sites is not a one-time event but an on-
going process. New program models are inevitably 
adjusted during the process of implementation 
when real-world considerations make it necessary 
to modify the theoretical ideal. In the same way, as 
programs are replicated in a wide range of settings 
with their own local characteristics, reality intrudes 
again and creates the need for adaptation. Even 
beyond those circumstances, knowledge gained 
during an ongoing process of replication can lead 
program developers to more fully understand how 
speciﬁc elements may need to be redeﬁned, or new 
elements added, to reproduce the success of the 
original program. Because its replication has been 
underway since 1997 and now includes some 200 
sites in 23 states, the Nurse-Family Partnership 
provides a good example of the kind of deliberate 
ﬂexibility that is generally required during a replica-
tion initiative.
Theory and Research
The components of the Nurse-Family Partnership 
grew from the integration of three well-established 
theories about human behavior. One, self-efﬁcacy 
theory, focuses on the individual: it describes psy-
chological factors that inﬂuence people’s motivation 
for, and persistence in, changing their behaviors. 
A Research-Based Model:  
The Nurse-Family Partnership
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That theory formed the basis of the program’s 
decision to focus on ﬁrst-time mothers, beginning 
in pregnancy, and to engage them in an extensive, 
incremental process of developing conﬁdence in 
their abilities as parents and responsible adults. 
New to parenting, these women have not yet de-
veloped established ways of caring for themselves 
during pregnancy and for their children once they 
are born, and thus are more likely to be motivated 
to acquire information and guidance. Helping moth-
ers make plans for themselves and their babies and 
set a series of short-term, achievable goals toward 
fulﬁlling those plans enables them to make steady 
progress and gradually gain control over the di-
rection of their lives. It was believed that nurses, 
because of their knowledge about health issues and 
their credibility in the community, would be more 
able than other types of home visitors to help 
mothers in these ways.
The second theory, attachment theory, includes 
the idea that a child who has a healthy attachment 
to her or his mother during infancy is more likely 
to develop in a healthy way over time. This theory 
helped drive the program’s focus on the forma-
tion of the mother-child relationship. Teaching 
mothers how to recognize and respond to their 
babies’ moods and take proper care of them means 
healthy attachment becomes more likely. Thus, the 
frequency and content of the home visits during 
the two and a half years mothers are expected to 
remain in the program were designed to reﬂect 
the different stages in the mother’s relationship 
with her developing child and to help her adjust to 
each stage.
Human ecology theory, the third theory underly-
ing the NFP, describes the effects of environmental 
inﬂuences—such as communities, social networks 
and other family members—on family life. This 
theory helped to focus the program’s interest in 
addressing the reality that mothers and their babies 
are situated within a web of other relationships 
and that mothers need to know how to manage 
these relationships to beneﬁt themselves and their 
children. To reﬂect this concern, the program was 
designed to include speciﬁc content on engaging 
family members and friends in the mother’s efforts 
to care for her child and herself, and to have home 
visitors help refer mothers to other community 
services they may need.
The fact that elements of the program were 
grounded in these theories helped simplify the 
task of deﬁning the initial model for replication. In 
addition, the NFP had taken the unusual step of 
formally testing whether one of its elements was, 
in fact, essential. Managers recognized that stafﬁng 
was key to the program’s successful operation—its 
effectiveness depends on the home visitor estab-
lishing close rapport with the mothers she visits 
and having the skills and knowledge to adapt the 
program’s written guidelines so they work for in-
dividual families. In order to learn whether it was 
necessary for the home visitors to be nurses or 
whether paraprofessionals could do the work as 
effectively, researchers measured the resulting dif-
ferences in program implementation and outcomes 
when each of these groups served as home visitors. 
Compared to the nurses, the paraprofessionals 
completed fewer visits and had a higher turnover 
rate—signiﬁcant issues in a program that relies on 
a close relationship between the mother and the 
home visitor for its effectiveness. Paraprofessionals 
also adhered to the program’s home-visit guidelines 
less rigorously than nurses. And, most importantly, 
nurses produced signiﬁcantly stronger outcomes 
for the mothers and children.9
Random assignment research, including the 
above-mentioned test of paraprofessionals versus 
nurses, had demonstrated that the NFP is highly 
successful in achieving its goals,10 and thus devel-
opers were particularly careful about keeping the 
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basic model intact as they began the widespread 
replication process. At the same time, though, 
the NFP had been tested and refined under con-
trolled conditions in three carefully selected sites. 
Out in the world, of course, other forces came 
into play, and program developers had to learn to 
accommodate them.
Broadening Deﬁnitions
Two of the original NFP sites had been in urban areas, 
while the third was in a relatively small, semi-rural 
area in upstate New York. As the program began to 
expand to other parts of the country, its develop-
ers quickly found that geographic and demographic 
realities would require modiﬁcations in some aspects 
of the model. Originally, for example, each new site 
was expected to begin with a client base of 100 fami-
lies—a number large enough to make an impact but 
small enough for sites to handle well while they were 
gaining experience with the program. However, as the 
NFP moved into rural locations, it became obvious 
that the populations were sometimes too dispersed 
for sites in those areas to be able to enroll that num-
ber of families and that the element deﬁning program 
size would need to become more ﬂexible. Similarly, 
the NFP had originally considered it essential that 
each visiting nurse have a caseload of 25 families, a 
number small enough for her to maintain close con-
tact with each mother but large enough to control 
the cost of the program. However, because of the long 
distances that nurses had to travel to make visits in 
rural areas, program developers allowed for slightly 
smaller caseloads in those situations.
In addition to geographic challenges, other local char-
acteristics necessitated modiﬁcations in some aspects 
of the model. The most important was in the qualiﬁca-
tions of the nurse home visitors. When NFP ﬁrst be-
gan replicating, the developers considered it essential 
that the home visitors have a four-year bachelor’s de-
gree in nursing—they believed this educational back-
ground would help new staff more readily understand 
the theoretical basis of the program and its relation 
to the home visits and, thus, would be more effective 
than hiring nurses with less academic education, such 
as a two-year associate’s degree.
But some potential sites pointed out that there 
were very few bachelor’s-prepared nurses in their 
communities, and when program developers ex-
amined the educational backgrounds of the nurs-
ing workforce around the country, they realized 
that whole regions might effectively be disqualiﬁed 
because of their fairly small percentages of nurses 
with four-year degrees. One replication state that 
included several sites already had some nurses 
without a bachelor’s degree working as home 
visitors, and so program evaluators were able to 
do a preliminary analysis to see if educational 
credentials mattered in that state’s early perfor-
mance indicators. When it did not reveal major 
differences, the developers became more comfort-
able about modifying the education standard to be 
somewhat more ﬂexible: while a bachelor’s degree 
was still strongly preferred for the home visitors, 
sites could hire other nurses as long as they had 
relevant experience.
Becoming More Explicit
In some cases, experiences with new sites led to 
additions to the essential elements after the repli-
cation had begun—or, at least, to making particular 
elements more explicit. For example, one key to 
the NFP’s success is that it begins during pregnancy, 
when health issues dominate and the nurse visitor 
is better able to establish rapport with the mother, 
who is likely to have many questions about this 
ﬁrst experience of having a baby. Research had sug-
gested that mothers should be enrolled by their 
28th week of pregnancy for the program to be able 
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to affect pregnancy outcomes (by helping mothers 
modify their health-related behavior, including nutri-
tion, smoking, drinking and taking drugs).
Thus, early in the replication effort, the 28th week 
of pregnancy was identiﬁed as the outer limit for 
enrollment; and based on their experience with the 
three original test sites, developers assumed that 
many of the mothers would be enrolled earlier, 
which was clearly desirable. However, as they col-
lected data from replication sites, it became clear 
that efforts in many sites were driven more by the 
desire to avoid enrolling women after the 28th 
week than by the value of enrolling them earlier. 
Developers addressed this by becoming more 
explicit, emphasizing that participants should be 
enrolled by their 16th week of pregnancy, with the 
28th week as the cutoff point.
Similarly, while program developers were aware 
that the nurses needed ﬂexible schedules so they 
could make visits in the evening and on weekends 
to accommodate the schedules of the mothers, ar-
ranging for this ﬂexibility had not been a problem in 
the three test sites. It had not been included as an 
essential element at the beginning of the replication 
initiative; instead, it was simply a topic brought up 
during discussions with potential new sites. How-
ever, as the program expanded, the developers 
found that in sites where nurses were unionized, 
ﬂexible scheduling had the potential to become 
a complex issue that could lead to overtime pay 
and therefore higher program costs. For the pro-
gram to work, nurses had to be able to adapt to 
the mothers’ schedules because regular meetings 
were essential for success, so developers built in 
ﬂexible schedules for the nurses as an essential 
element, not something that could be negotiated 
and modiﬁed.
The NFP’s developers also realized early in the 
replication that more attention needed to be given 
to local political support for the program. At the 
start, so long as sites had funding and were com-
mitted to meeting the deﬁned requirements of the 
model, they were usually approved for replication. 
But it became increasingly evident that adequate 
funding, though a necessary condition, was not al-
ways sufﬁcient to assure the program’s acceptance 
in the community. Without that acceptance, it might 
be difﬁcult to sustain the program when the initial 
commitment of funding ended. To solve this prob-
lem, two new essential elements were added: one 
calling for broad support from community leaders 
and the other requiring that the NFP be coordinat-
ed with other programs serving the same popula-
tion. These elements, along with the other required 
components that deﬁne the program model, are 
described in the application materials that all inter-
ested communities and states receive when they 
are considering the NFP.
The experience of the Nurse-Family Partnership 
replication is unusual in both its extensiveness and 
in the degree to which decisions about modifying 
the model have been driven by data. But its les-
sons are instructive for any replication effort. 
Whether modiﬁcations to required elements are 
made because of the need to accommodate lo-
cal characteristics of replication sites or because 
program developers gain insights into adjustments 
that could strengthen the model, decisions should 
be made cautiously, carefully balancing sites’ needs 
for ﬂexibility with the equal necessity of ensuring 
that what is essential remains intact.
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When the Nurse-Family Partnership conducted a 
rigorous test to determine whether the program’s 
outcomes were affected when paraprofessionals 
rather than nurses were used as the home visitors, 
it accomplished something that is extremely rare. 
From a scientiﬁc standpoint, the ideal way to iden-
tify a program’s essential elements would be to test 
each one in this way, thus allowing conﬁdent iden-
tiﬁcation of those elements that are really essential 
to performance and those that are not. However, 
no signiﬁcant social program has ever undergone 
such an examination. The methods involved are 
complex, and the time and expense of conducting 
the analysis would be considerable. Someday the 
necessary effort may be undertaken. Until then, the 
task of identifying essential elements remains large-
ly a matter of making the best possible judgments 
by drawing on applicable theory, research ﬁndings, 
ﬁeld experience and common sense.
There are more and less effective ways of rendering 
this judgment. But as the developers of REAL En-
terprises, among others, have learned from experi-
ence, no program should be offered for replication 
until the way it works can be clearly explained. Pro-
gram quality will vary too much in new sites unless 
developers can describe which aspects of their 
models are crucial to performance.
The three programs discussed in the preceding pag-
es—Philadelphia@Work, Plain Talk and the Nurse-
Family Partnership—all, in their own ways, show 
that deﬁning essential elements, while not always 
easy, is nonetheless feasible. And they point toward 
several lessons that ought to apply to any program 
or initiative seeking to extend its reach:
1. Thoroughly document activities during 
a program’s testing phase. More detail is 
always better than less. While it was possible 
to reconstruct the experiences of the original 
Plain Talk sites, the process could have been 
streamlined and made more reliable if activities 
had been carefully documented during the plan-
ning and implementation periods. The aim is not 
to be able to create a highly speciﬁc, prescrip-
tive model: the value of keeping an ongoing, 
detailed record of the test experience is that it 
enables more fully informed judgments about 
which elements are essential to include in the 
replicable model.
2. Be sure that programs offered for replica-
tion cohere internally. All three programs 
represent persuasive examples of coherence: 
their elements reinforce and complement one 
another to produce the kind of results for 
which the model was designed. It takes time to 
develop coherence in a program, even when a 
model is based on sound logic, an established 
underlying theory or a comprehensive theory 
of change. The original department-based staff-
ing structure of Philadelphia@Work is a good 
example of an element that worked against 
coherence, however logical it seemed when the 
model was initially designed. It was only when 
the organization moved to a team-based struc-
ture that the stafﬁng conﬁguration reinforced, 
rather than undermined, the otherwise coher-
ent program design.
3. Always assume that a program model 
derived from limited local experience will 
have to be modiﬁed for replication. This 
was clearly the case with Philadelphia@Work. 
Examination of its experience in Philadelphia 
revealed features that would have to be modi-
ﬁed for the program to work elsewhere. It was 
also true for the Nurse-Family Partnership, 
a highly reﬁned, theory-driven program. The 
strong model that emerged from its three con-
trolled test sites turned out to need a number 
of adjustments (for example, lower caseloads 
in rural areas) to work in the less controlled 
real world.
Conclusion
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4. Be prepared to add to the program mod-
el to accommodate more of the reality 
in which it will be replicated. Programs are 
often regarded as self-contained entities with 
clear conceptual boundaries. But this is hardly 
the reality in which they get implemented. 
Simply to operate, a program must reach out 
into its environment and forge relations with 
participants, other service providers, funders 
and community stakeholders. Thus, it makes 
sense for program developers to identify which 
aspects of this larger reality should be incorpo-
rated into the design for replication. The Nurse-
Family Partnership has done so, increasing its 
ability to replicate its good outcomes.
5. Let the program model—and the envi-
ronment in which it operates—change 
over time. Programs that get replicated are 
not static, even though that is sometimes what 
the word “replication” conjures in people’s 
minds. The world changes, and programs, no 
matter how rigorously deﬁned to begin with, 
must change with it. While none of the pro-
grams discussed here has yet faced the need 
to change in this way, it is likely that they will. 
A funding source may begin or end, or public 
policy will shift, and the program will need to 
adapt to that change. One purpose of identify-
ing essential elements and reinforcing adher-
ence to them is to instill discipline into the 
process of change and adaptation. What hurts 
the replication and expansion of programs is 
random change, not change per se. Under-
standing the essential elements and how they 
cohere means understanding how and why a 
program works. It makes it possible to modify 
a program thoughtfully, with an awareness of 
the effects that modiﬁcation could have on the 
program’s outcomes.
There is no shortage of programs that give repli-
cation a try. Although some do extremely well in 
reproducing their value on a greater scale, many are 
compromised as they expand, diluting the promise 
they may have had. It need not be this way. When 
programs have demonstrated their effectiveness, 
knowing how they work and why they work is an 
indispensable ﬁrst step to preserving their quality 
as they scale up. Programs that successfully identify 
their essential elements have a better chance to 
fulﬁll their own potential and also to increase the 
conﬁdence of policymakers, philanthropists and the 
public that social investment can, in fact, make a 
reliable difference.
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